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This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 1998-1999 European Forum 
programme on Recasting the European Welfare State: Options, Constraints, Actors,
directed by Professors Maurizio Ferrera (Universities of Pavia and Bocconi, Milano) and 
Martin Rhodes (Robert Schuman Centre).
Adopting a broad, long-term and comparative perspective, the Forum will aim to:
■ scrutinize the complex web of social, economic and political challenges to contemporary 
European welfare states;
• identify the various options for, and constraints on institutional reform;
• discuss the role of the various actors in promoting or hindering this reform at the national, 
sub-national and supra-national level;
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Like most European countries, the past decade has been one of continuity and 
change in the Canadian health care sector. On the one hand, the delivery and 
financing of health care in Canada remains constant: independently- 
administered hospitals and fee-for-service medical care delivered within 
publicly-funded provincial health care systems. On the other hand, momentous 
changes have occurred in which public funding has been reduced, health care 
services have been curtailed, and health providers are increasingly regulated. 
This has led to a situation in which, while there remains a political commitment 
to and public consensus for “medicare” in Canada, severe cracks are beginning 
to show. Public opinion data, which measured overwhelming support for the 
health care system just ten short years ago, now reflect growing uneasiness 
about the functioning and future of health care in Canada. Discussions of 
privatization and market incentives, once taboo in Canadian political discourse, 
are becoming more frequent, particularly among politicians of the right, medical 
associations, and influential think tanks.
This paper examines some of the recent changes in the Canadian health 
care system and describes some of the market incentives in the health care 
sector. In contrast to European health care systems in transition, the extent and 
potential for market incentives is still very limited in the Canadian context. 
While there is evidence of some “marketlike mechanisms” (Evans 1997) used as 
management tools within the public sector within the public sector, the 
introduction of “quasi-markets” in which services are funded through the 
private sector, has not been as widespread in Canada as in other countries.
The first part of the paper explains why market incentives remain limited 
in Canada by tracing some of the institutional process of health policy 
development and change. The second part of the paper reviews some of the 
recent reforms in provincial health care systems, focussing on “supply-side” 
instruments (to regulate the quantity of health services) and “demand-side” 
incentives (limits to demand in the public sector and attempt to respond to 
excess demand through the private sector). Third, the paper reviews some of the 
proposals for parallel private markets and internal markets that are being 
discussed in Canada. The conclusions reflect upon the fact that there are two 
ways of observing the present situation in health reform in Canada: on the one 
hand, financial pressures from reduced public budgets, political forces in the 
guise of right-wing governments and organized medicine, and the rise in public
1 This paper was prepared for the European Forum conference, "Beyond the Health Care 
State: Institutional Innovations and New Priorities in Access Coverage and Provisions of 




























































































dissatisfaction may all provide windows of opportunity for the introduction of 
private market alternatives in Canadian health care; on the other hand, the 
existing structure of the health care system and the institutional contours of 
health policy place limits on the extent of market incentives in Canada.
PART ONE: INSTITUTIONS AND THE HEALTH POLICY PROCESS 
The Development of Public Health Care in Canada
Comparative research has shown the processes by which institutions have an 
impact on policy outcomes in industrialized countries. For example, Immergut 
(1992) has shown how the types of "veto points" in political institutions can 
constrain interest group strategies in European health policy debates. Another 
such process is the way in which formal institutions condition the role of 
political parties. In Canada, the design of Canadian federalism and the patterns 
of partisan politics shaped the development of public health care in Canada 
(Maioni 1997). Although intergovernmental conflict delayed the process of 
health policy development, decentralization also encouraged provincial 
experimentation and led to the innovations that became the basis of public 
health insurance throughout Canada (Tuohy 1989; Gray 1991). A left-wing 
provincial party, the CCF-NDP in Saskatchewan, inaugurated the first 
government-sponsored hospital insurance (in 1947) and medical insurance (in 
1962) systems in North America. The success of these innovations, combined 
with the political pressure exerted by the CCF-NDP’s federal counterpart, was 
pivotal in convincing the national Liberal government to pass landmark 
legislation to share the costs of provincial programs in hospital insurance (under 
the Hospital and Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, 1957) and medical care 
(under the Medical Care Insurance Act, 1966). Part of the federal government’s 
rationale for engaging in such cost sharing was to avoid the development of a 
“crazy-quilt” of provincial health insurance programs by making federal money 
contingent upon the provinces’ upholding certain principles of universality, 
comprehensiveness, portability and public funding. The goal was to ensure that 
Canadian taxpayers’ money would be used to help finance publicly accountable 
health insurance systems that ensured the same basic social rights among 
Canadian citizens, regardless of their province of residence.
By 1971, public hospital and medical insurance plans were in operation in 
all the provinces. The development of a publicly-financed system with 
negotiated physician fee schedules and government-financed hospital budgets 
allowed for some measure of cost control but the retention of fee-for-service 
reimbursement and the open-ended nature of the cost-sharing arrangements 




























































































Financing Act (EPF) replaced cost sharing with block funding (partly cash, 
partly tax points) based on population and tied to the rate of increase in GNP 
(Soderstrom 1978). In so doing, the federal government effectively devolved the 
responsibility to exercise restraint and control health care expenditures to the 
provinces, making them "100 percent at risk for cost increases." (Tuohy 1986).
Many of the practices the provinces allowed, including increased use of 
extra-billing and user fees, were seen as undermining national standards in 
health care. The Canada Health Act of 1984, which consolidated hospital and 
medical insurance under a single statute, finally enforced a federal ban on these 
measures by imposing an additional condition on the provinces, equal access to 
health services with dollar-for-dollar financial penalties (Bégin, 1987). 
Although this sparked considerable controversy about federal interference in 
provincial jurisdiction and resistance from provider groups (including a doctor’s 
strike in Ontario), by April 1987, all of the provinces had banned user-fees and 
extra-billing (except in Québec, where such bans were already in effect).
When the Conservative government came to power in the mid-1980s, it 
implemented significant reductions in cash transfers to the provinces, leading 
critics to suggest that the federal government was “off-loading” its deficit 
problems onto the provinces (Boothe and Johnson 1992). The most important 
reductions, however, occurred with a new Liberal government: the 1995 federal 
budget announced that funding for provincial health systems would now be 
amalgamated into a “super-grant”, the Canada Health and Social Transfer 
(CHST), which would substantially reduce the cash portion of federal transfers 
while at the same time still obliging the provinces to heed the conditions of the 
Canada Health Act (Smith 1995). Under increasing pressure from provincial 
governments and public opinion, the federal government finally announced 
increases in health care transfers. The 1999 federal budget, unveiled on 
February 16, announced the injection of C$11,5 billion over five years to health 
transfers to the provinces and, although there has been virulent opposition to the 
new funding formula in Québec, the budget confirms the federal government’s 
renewed commitment to providing predictable funding for public health care in 
Canada.
The Impact of Recent Changes in the Health Care Sector
The fiscal and political repercussions of the events of the past decade are four­
fold. First, reductions in public funding available for health care have led to 
significant changes in the delivery of services (discussed in the following 
section) and on the public-private mix of money in the health care system. The 
most significant of these is the increase in private spending, whether out-of- 




























































































spent C$75.3 billion or 9.2% of GDP on health care. In terms of spending-to- 
GDP ratio, which has declined every year since 1993, Canada ranks fourth 
among OECD countries (9.2% of GDP in 1996; preliminary figures for 1998 
estimate spending will total C$80 billion or 9.1% of GDP) (OECD 1998).
More importantly, the ratio of private to public expenditure has also 
declined. In 1996, private expenditures accounted for 29.7% of total spending 
while estimates for 1998 project still further increases in private funding, to 
30.3% of the health care total. Although these figures are not out of the average 
range for OECD countries, Canada nevertheless fall in the lower tier of these 
countries in terms of private to public expenditure ratio, with higher amounts 
spent in the private sector than many countries with more developed private 
health care markets. As explained in the next section, this increase in private 
financing is related to decreased public funding; it is also partly accounted for 
by changes in the types of services delivered. For example, drug expenditures, 
which made up only 8.5% of health care spending in 1976 and 10 % in 1986, 
accounted for 13.6% in 1996 and is estimated to increase to 14% in 1998 
(Government of Canada, 1996; Canadian Institute for Health Information, 
1998).
Table 1: Health Expenditures in Canada
1986 1996
Total as % GDP 8.5% 9.2%
Private as % total 27% 29.7%
Drug spending as % total 10% 13.6%
Source: Canadian Institute for Health Information, 1998.
Second, in terms of inter-governmental relations, provincial governments have 
signalled dissatisfaction with federal government decisions that changed the 
fiscal rules of the health policy game. They also initiated discussions on how to 
best preserve health and social programs in the face of federal disengagement 
through a “social union” between the provinces. Federal transfer cuts have also 
empowered Conservative leaders in some provinces to question the legitimacy 
of the imposition of federal standards while in Québec, such unilateral federal 




























































































Third, these developments offered a political opportunity for proponents 
of private market alternatives to question the legitimacy of the Canada Health 
Act and to suggest the introduction of market incentives in the Canadian health 
care sector. Most influential have been provincial medical associations, 
particularly in Ontario and British Columbia and the national Canadian Medical 
Association (CMA) itself. In the past few years, CMA general meetings have 
been open forums of debate over the desirability of private medicine and market 
incentives in Canada. While resolutions favoring this approach have been 
narrowly defeated at these meetings, they have gained considerable currency 
within the medical community. The Canadian Medical Association has 
advocated a public debate on private alternatives to health care and recent CMA 
polls suggest that 70% of Canadian doctors favour a two-tier health care system 
(Gray 1996)
Finally, public opinion has turned against government attempts to cut 
costs in the health care sector as Canadians began to express decreased 
confidence in the public health care system. The past decade has seen a rapid 
and significant shift in public opinion on health care. This is particularly evident 
in observing cross-national comparisons, in which Canadians went from the 
highest overall satisfaction in the late 1980s to a profound sense of unease about 
health care by the late 1990s (Blendon et al. 1990; 1995). The latest such data 
show that 23% of Canadians feel the health care system needs to be rebuilt 
while 46% agreed that recent health reforms have compromised the quality of 
service (Blendon et al. 1998).
Table 2: Canadian Public Opinion in Comparative Perspective
System needs to be rebuilt System needs minor changes
1988 1998 1988 1998
Canada 5% 23% 56% 20%
United States 29% 33% 10% 17%
United Kingdom 17% 14% 27% 25%
Australia 17% 30% 34% 18%




























































































While studies commissioned by the National Forum on Health in 1994 found 
that an overwhelming majority of Canadians support the principles of the 
Canada Health Act, in particular equality of access, more recent polls reveal that 
an increasing number seem to favour the introduction of some market 
incentives; for example, a recent poll found that 51% of Canadians would be 
willing to pay user fees for non-emergency medical services (Government of 
Canada, 1997).
Table 3: Public Opinion of Canadians on Health Care System
Willing to pay more for non-emergency trip to doctor? 51%
Willing to pay room and board at hospital? 31%
Federal government should set national standards? 56%
Source: Angus Reid Group, 1998.
PART TWO: HEALTH REFORM: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
Since the mid-1980s, almost all industrialized countries have been engaged in 
the discourse and practice of health reform, mainly in terms of how to balance 
issues of cost containment and access to care (OECD 1994). At least two 
explanations can help account for these similar trends across different countries. 
First, is the larger experience of the end of the expansionary era of social 
expenditure and the politics of retrenchment across established welfare states 
(Pierson 1996). As public health care systems are often among the most 
expensive social programs, pressures for the reduction of public expenditures in 
general have had an impact on the funding of health care in particular. Second, 
is the nature of the health care services market itself. The end of the "golden 
age" of the welfare state coincided with the rise of the "gilded age" in the cost of 
health care. Breakthroughs in pharmaceutical research, the dissemination of 
expensive new technology and medical interventions, coupled with a more 
demanding and sophisticated patient clientele and an aging population, have all 





























































































Although the types of reforms vary across countries, virtually every 
OECD country has introduced some form of cost containment, through 
restraints in public health care expenditures, direct price controls on health care 
services, and/or the imposition of global budgets for health care. In many 
countries, competition measures have been introduced as a way to boost 
efficiency in the delivery and financing of health care. Canadian governments 
have also pursued cost containment strategies that involve global expenditure 
restraints in addition to specific measures targeted at providers of health care 
services. In both initiatives, however, incentives for market competition have 
been conspicuously absent.
In the past decade, every provincial government in Canada attempted 
some reform of the health care sector. Often presented in the context of 
responding to new demands and pressures in society, these reforms were 
generally implemented in the context of reducing public expenditures and 
"rationalizing" the health care system (Deber et al. 1994). With the soaring costs 
of medical care combined with the decrease in federal transfers, provincial 
governments now spend on average one-third of their total budget expenditures 
on health care. The increased fiscal pressure on provincial governments has led 
to attempts to regulate more aggressively the supply of health care, both through 
hospital services and imposing controls on physicians, since these costs drive 
health spending more than consumer demand (Evans 1984). The use of these 
cost-control instruments has been influenced by the objectives of health reform; 
that is, whether provincial reform is to involve more state intervention through 
regulation of the health sector, or whether cost control in the public sector opens 
up the possibility of less state regulation in the private market for health care.
Federal spending in the health sector initially led to a certain convergence 
among the provinces in terms of the adoption of public health insurance systems 
that involved the substitution of private for public financing of health care. In so 
doing, heath care spending became an area of open political conflict, in which 
"cost control involves conflict between providers and payers" and where 
initiatives for reform had to do with controlling the supply and demand for 
health care (Evans 1989). The implementation of health insurance in the 
provinces involved two basic premises that were shaped by this conflict: First, 
under the terms of the original 1966 Medical Care Act, health insurance plans 
were to be publicly administered and had to cover all residents for insured 
services under the plan. Provincial governments through the imposition of 
global budgets in hospitals and the negotiation of fee schedules would regulate 
thus, the supply of health care, and those that produced it, with doctors. In 
return, administrators and physicians would retain relative autonomy in their 
professional spheres. The second comprise, reinforced by the 1984 Canada 




























































































"uniform terms and conditions" meaning, in effect, that the demand for health 
care could not be restrained (through extra-billing or user fees) to thus avoid the 
emergence of two-tiered medicine. This gave the provinces leverage over the 
medical profession and many private insurance interests who hotly contested the 
public model.
As provincial governments attempt to control deficits through reductions 
in public spending, provincial health care systems have come under increasing 
pressure to reduce costs. Provinces have attempted to do this by controlling the 
supply of health care (through the closure of hospitals or hospital beds and 
restrictions on billing numbers or salary caps on doctors, for example) and also 
by controlling the direct demand from consumers (such as waiting lists for 
elective surgery or de-insurance of non-medically necessary services). In 
controlling supply, provinces have not come up against the principles of the 
Canada Health Act, and virtually every province has closed beds and hospitals 
over the past five years. Controls on demand, however, are more controversial 
because they raise the issue of what basket of benefits constitutes “medically 
necessary” services, to what extent deterrent measures can be used to avoid 
over-consumption of health care, and whether excess demand could be satisfied 
through private medicine.
The essential debate in these various attempts at reforming provincial 
health care systems has been between the regulation of the supply of services 
(and to a more limited degree, demand) in the health care sector in an effort to 
control total health costs, and the expansion of private sector initiatives that 
would offer additional supply to meet excess demand for health care.
Table 4: Principles of the Canada Health Act (1984)

































































































Supply-Side Incentives in the Health Care System
Hospital sector
Canadian hospitals are generally operated as non-profit institutions financed by 
global budgets negotiated with provincial governments. Although governments 
do not directly administer most hospitals, they are dependent on public funds 
for most of their operating costs (including personnel, medical supplies and 
equipment), and therefore subject to public decisions about how they operate. 
During the first decades of hospital insurance, provincial governments funded 
hospitals through "line-by-line" budget reviews and costs were then shared with 
the federal government. The process of global budgeting, in which hospital 
administrators are allotted regular payments for hospital operating costs, was 
accelerated after 1977 by the substitution of block funding under the EPF 
arrangement. Global budgets meant that hospital administrators allocated funds 
within the hospital at their discretion, but it also meant that they were 
responsible for creatively juggling resources. With the acceleration in federal 
cuts after 1990, hospitals reduced the availability of hospital beds, limited the 
use of new equipment, and reallocated services through waiting lists and 
outpatient care. The major fiscal objective in bed closures is to reduce labor 
costs, a process that has faced stiff opposition from provincial labor 
organizations. Another motivation, however, has been to reduce the supply of 
services (beds, operating room facilities) available for doctors to use in the 
system.
In the past decade, but most particularly since 1990, all the provinces 
have imposed cuts in hospital spending, which has led to the "downsizing" of 
the hospital system and the "consolidation" of services provided (Deber et al. 
1994; Evans 1989). Bed, laboratory, operating room and entire hospital closures 
have been the principal methods of cost control for hospital administrators and 
provincial health departments. For example, the Parti québécois government in 
Québec encouraged the amalgamation of university teaching hospitals in 
Montréal and Québec City and initiated the most widespread reduction in 
hospital services: the closure of 7 Montréal and 5 Québec City hospitals, with 
funds to be reallocated to other health care priorities, such as expanding the 
CLSC network, long-term care and home care (Lessard 1995). In 
Newfoundland and New Brunswick more than 10% of hospital beds were 
closed, while in Saskatchewan, provincial funding was eliminated for 52 of 134 
hospitals. Although the result has been longer waiting lists for elective 
procedures and non-emergency in-patient services, as well as overcrowding of 
emergency rooms and a greater reliance on outpatient care, these supply-side 




























































































In addition to downsizing, most provinces have also decentralized 
decision-making through the creation of regional health boards (some elected, 
others appointed) responsible for the allocation of funding and services. While 
this rationalizes budget making to some extent (by imposing fixed regional 
budgets) it also leads to passing the burden of accountability from provincial 
health ministries to local groups. In Alberta, for example, the Conservative 
government’s 1994 Deficit Reduction Act mandated the 17 regional health 
boards to cut C$3 billion from the provincial health care budget over a three 
year period (Caimey 1995). Changes implemented by social-democratic 
governments in British Columbia and Saskatchewan have stressed local 
decision-making and community-based care (Hurley et al. 1993). Regional 
health boards and community health councils will make decisions about 
transferring acute care to outpatient and home care in British Columbia. 
Saskatchewan created regional health boards with wide allocation discretion 
that rapidly implemented hospital closures.
Medical services
Although provincial health care plans cover most “medically necessary” 
services provided by physicians (both in-patient and ambulatory), there is some 
variation in terms of defining uninsured services. Some of these may be in­
patient, such as a private hospital room (as opposed to a ward), or outpatient, 
such as chiropractic services (covered in Ontario but not in Québec). Such 
extras can be covered by private insurance or paid for by patients directly but 
they remain relatively limited. Nevertheless, in recent years, private clinics have 
sprung up to offer services no longer offered by public plans, such as eye-laser 
surgery and in vitro fertilization, or diagnostic testing that would otherwise 
involve lengthy waits in the public system, such as MRIs or genetic screening. 
In addition, some private clinics now offer an extensive range of surgical and 
other interventions but they must limit their clientele to non-Canadians or to 
Canadians willing to pay for the entire cost of their medical care. Although 
private clinics, and the doctors who would like to practice there, claim that 
excess demand in the public system could be met by the excess capacity that 
exists in the private settings, provincial regulations and the Canada Health Act 
have so far limited the range of such alternative venues.
The willingness of Canadian doctors to contemplate alternatives to public 
health care stem in part from supply-side incentives that have directly targeted 
them in the past few years. The health care system in Canada is based on the 
consensus that doctors accept public funding in return for the freedom to 
practice on an essentially private, fee-for-service basis. Although negotiated 
reimbursement was designed to control cost escalation, the open-ended nature 
of such arrangements has allowed doctors considerable inflationary discretion of 




























































































supply of doctors who, in their role as gatekeepers, effectively determine the use 
of health services (Brown 1991).
Provinces generally pay physicians through a fee schedule negotiated 
with provincial medical associations. The amount of these fees, and the way 
they are imposed varies quite a bit, as do practices that regulate physician 
supply. In Québec, for example, the explicit emphasis on collective goals, 
primary health and community services, has led to more open confrontation and 
cooperation with the medical profession (Demers 1994). In addition to 
reimbursing physicians at a lower rate than most other provinces, Québec 
allows for salaried reimbursement through staffing of its CLSCs (community 
health and social services clinics) by salaried physicians. Québec was the first 
province to impose limits on billing, caps on specialist salaries, and differential 
fees to physicians with new billing numbers on the basis of their practice and 
residence within the province. Québec was also at the forefront of attempts to 
reduce medical school enrollments, to modify the GP-specialist ratio, and to 
tackle the problem of regional distribution of doctors through the imposition of 
financial penalties and incentives. Most provinces have implemented some or 
all of these measures as well, with varying degrees of success. A social- 
democratic government in Ontario attempted unsuccessfully to impose income 
caps on doctors while in British Columbia, the government’s use of differential 
fees has come under attack in the courts (Manfredi and Maioni 1998).
The medical profession in Canada has reacted with a dual message to 
such initiatives. On the one hand, physicians, once among the most vocal 
opponents of “socialized medicine”, have now become stakeholders in
provincial health care systems and must lobby governments to maintain 
adequate funding for the public health care system. On the other hand, some 
provincial medical associations (in Ontario and British Columbia) have
advocated the introduction of private market incentives into the health care such 
as user fees and two-tiered medicine as a way of soaking up excess demand and 
capacity (Canadian Medical Association 1993).
Attempts to regulate demand for health services
Control of the demand of health care represents an area in which provincial 
initiatives come into much more direct conflict with the federal government 
because of the conditions imposed on federal transfers. Limits on the access to 
publicly insured health care, through extra-billing or user fees have been much 
more controversial because they directly address the balance between 
government regulation and access .
The federal conditions established in 1966 provided for "reasonable




























































































"reasonable access" to insured services not be impeded (Taylor 1990). By 1980, 
the federal government had decided that access to health care was threatened by 
the widespread use of extra-billing, in which physicians charged their patients in 
excess of the provincial fee schedule and, not incidentally, pumped millions of 
additional dollars into overall health care spending. Extra billing had featured 
prominently in the strikes against public health insurance by Saskatchewan 
doctors in 1962 and Québec specialists in 1970. The explicit ban on extra- 
billing by the terms of the 1984 Canada Health Act led Saskatchewan, Nova 
Scotia, and Manitoba to prohibit the practice. In Alberta and Ontario, where 
extra-billing created the greatest barriers to access, Conservative governments 
initially resisted the federal government's intrusion, but the ban prevailed after a 
strike by Ontario doctors in 1986; economic pressures led Alberta to do the 
same in 1987. The persistence of extra-billing by some British Columbia 
doctors resulted in the withholding of $1.75 million to the province from federal 
transfers in 1994 (Howard 1994). Since 1995, such practices have ended.
More conflict has centered on user fees, the direct out-of-pocket 
contribution of patients for their health costs (Sutherland and Fulton 1994). 
Although user fees are tolerated for pharmaceutical provision (e.g., deductibles 
for prescription drugs), health care institutions that are financed by public funds 
are explicitly prohibited from imposing user fees on the basis that this impedes 
equal access to health care. The equal access provisions of the Canada Health 
Act brought an end to these practices, although Québec's Liberal government 
flirted with the idea of a $5 charge on hospital visits in 1991 to discourage over­
consumption and curtail reliance on emergency-room care (Gouvernement du 
Québec 1991).
More controversial issues include the leasing of public facilities to 
provide privately-insured care (e.g., in Calgary the Health Resources Group 
refurbished the Grace Hospital to do so), the use of excess capacity in some 
hospitals to attract foreign patients (e.g., the case of the Institut de cardiologie in 
Montréal) and the imposition of facility fees by private clinics whose operating 
costs are not covered by public funds. Such clinics operate in many provinces, 
most notably British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario, and are gaining an 
important foothold in the health care system. In Alberta, for example, the 
Gimbel Eye Centre provides a range of opthamologist services not covered by 
provincial health care, and similar clinics now operate in many major Canadian 
cities. In some cases, these for-profit private clinics offer not only non-insured 
services (such as eye-laser and cosmetic surgery) but also a range of diagnostic 
services and medical interventions paid for directly by patients, such as the 




























































































The federal government has responded by reducing fiscal transfers to 
provinces that allowed such private clinics to impose facility or user fees for 
patients who were willing to pay to “jump the queue” for insured services (for 
example, cataract surgery, considered to be an insured service in the public 
health care system). This action was directed mainly at the Conservative 
government in Alberta, which has endorsed the development of private clinics. 
After a protracted political battle, in which Premier Ralph Klein threatened to 
take the federal government to court over the right to administer health care and 
the federal government responded by deducting hundreds of thousands of 
dollars from transfers to the province, the Alberta government disallowed 
facility fees in 1997 (Mitchell 1995).
Neither the federal government nor its provincial counterparts have 
banned the development of private clinics although it is not clear what role they 
will play in the future. Controversy over user fees in private clinics reveals a 
much more fundamental debate about the comprehensive and universal nature 
of public health insurance and the role of market mechanisms to reduce public 
spending. The gradual withdrawal of public funding since the early 1980s has 
contributed to the "silent privatization" of health care in which provinces have 
attempted to cut costs through shifting part of the burden to consumers of care 
and increasing the role of private insurers and providers in the system (Feschuck 
and Greenspon 1994). The replacement of surgical interventions through drug 
treatments, greater reliance on outpatient surgery, increases in waiting lists for 
non-essential services, and the de-listing of previously insured services, all open 





























































































Table 5: Provincial health reform initiatives
Supply o f hospital and medical services
• hospital closures/bed closures
• waiting lists for elective surgery
• global budgets for hospitals
• salary caps on physicians
• billing limits on physicians
• control of medical school enrolments
Demand for services
• user fees (no longer allowed)
• extra billing (no longer allowed)
PART THREE: MARKET INCENTIVES IN CANADA
In comparative context, Canada remains a laggard case in the development of 
competition measures and the introduction of market incentives in the health 
care sector. As noted previously, several OECD countries, from national health 
systems to social insurance regimes, have turned to such initiatives in an 
attempt to promote at least micro-efficiency in health care delivery and 
financing. Australia, the Netherlands, and the UK introduced the most far- 
reaching competition measures, attempting to devolve responsibility for health 
care from governments to consumers and providers of care by encouraging 
contracting for services and the development of parallel private markets for 
health care (OECD 1998). In Italy, contracting for services has also begun, and 
decentralization has been the key element in health care reform, as the 
responsibility for health care financing, and deficits, is transferred from the 
central government to the regions (Maino 1999). In Sweden and Germany, the 
trend has been the use of internal market mechanisms, including capitation and 
prospective global budgeting, and some competition between providers and 
insurance funds (Freeman 1998).
In Canada, as was discussed previously, health reform has involved cost- 
containment measures by both federal and provincial governments and 
administrative reorganization at the provincial level. In all these initiatives, 




























































































providers was, in comparative perspective, notably absent. Although the Canada 
Health Act and provincial health care systems as they are presently designed 
make it difficult to envisage how such types of market mechanisms could be 
introduced, the Canadian health care system is far from immune to change. In 
some respects, the building blocks of an alternative or parallel private health 
care alternative are already in place: insurers, entrepreneurs and a substantial 
number of provider groups that would welcome some form of private health 
care. In addition, there already exists a certain mix of public and private 
medicine in Canada to the extent that medical services are offered on a fee-for- 
service basis (albeit publicly funded) and that in several areas health facilities 
built by public funds are used on a for-profit basis by private companies.
In relative terms, however, market incentives are far from widespread in 
Canada, and the institutional limits to the expansion of private markets are still 
substantial. The following section summarizes three trends in market incentives 
in the Canadian context: parallel markets, internal markets and the regional 
boards.
Private Health Care Alternatives
The introduction of a full-fledged market incentive model would essentially 
transform the Canadian health-care system into a two-tiered one. In this 
scenario, doctors could choose to practice in either the public or private system. 
Allowing doctors to practice in both could be an option, although judging by the 
NHS example, “dual allegiance” is difficult to sustain (Richmond 1996). 
Supporters claim that a parallel private system could act as an "escape valve" to 
reduce pressures on the public system, such as waiting lists for surgery, over­
crowded emergency rooms, the drain of money to the US for those who can 
afford to pay for care, and the drain of doctors to the United States as well 
(McArthur et al. 1996). A variation on this model would be to redefine what 
“medically necessary” services should be covered by public health care, and to 
then allow provincial governments to “de-insure” certain procedures. In this 
scenario, general physician services and relatively straightforward procedures 
could remain under public provision, while more complicated (and expensive) 
treatments could be covered by private insurance (Silversides 1995; Charles et 
al. 1997).
Although neither of these models would necessarily involve replacing the 
public system, they suggest profound implications for the delivery of and access 
to health care in Canada. Critics claim that such initiatives would not be 
effective at cost-control but would instead pump much more money into the 
system, inflating costs for all users. In addition, despite the rhetoric of 




























































































sustaining high-quality providers and facilities. The co-existence of public and 
private delivery also raises the spectre of saddling the public system with the 
highest-risk, lowest-payoff patients, leading to a situation similar to that of 
“cherry-picking" and “dumping” in the private insurance market. Finally, if the 
existence of a private alternative ends up siphoning off upper and middle-class 
Canadians, the legitimacy of a tax-supported public system may be called into 
question (Evans 1993).
Besides these caveats, the immediate obstacles for the introduction of 
full-fledged market models remain essentially political ones: two-tiered 
medicine essentially contravenes the principles of the Canada Health Act, in 
particular the principle of equal access to medical services. In addition, such 
reforms would be politically difficult to introduce: despite the ambiguity of 
public opinion polls that reflect dissatisfaction with the present situation, it is far 
from clear that there is any consensus that a parallel private health care system 
would be popular among Canadians. Until such a consensus emerges, it remains 
politically risky for provincial leaders to advocate privatization and politically 
profitable for the federal government to portray itself as the “guardian” of the 
existing “Canadian model.”
Reform Through Internal Markets
Advocates of reform through “internal markets” claim that competition and 
access are not incompatible goals in health care provision and that they can 
serve as tools for greater efficiency within a publicly-funded system like 
Canada’s (Jérôme-Forget et al. 1995). The main problems of the public system 
are three-fold: the absence of incentives to increase hospital efficiency and the 
incentive for fee-for-service providers to inflate their billing practices; the moral 
hazard associated with consumers ignorance of the price of health care; and 
funding mechanisms that remain unpredictable (due to the use of general tax 
revenues and federal transfers) (OECD 1995). The main attempts at creating 
internal markets have so far focussed on the first set of problems. In the hospital 
system, enforced global budgets have led to substantial cost control, although 
the subsequent problems of over-crowding and waiting lists have yet to be fully 
resolved. Some hospitals are also experimenting with the introduction of DRG 
billing that would allow for more standardized accounting and cost 
comparisons. Physician incentives have focussed on reimbursement cost 
control, which has been less successful except where combined with salary caps 
and limits on physician supply. Other incentive measures attempted to create an 
effective “mix” of specialties and ensure a balanced regional distribution of 
providers. In addition, provinces have tried to create incentives for salary-based 





























































































More sophisticated internal market models suggest the solution for 
Canada lies in the development of “integrated” health care delivery systems 
through capitation and managed care to encourage sustained health care 
delivery (with an emphasis on disease prevention and continuity of care) at 
lower cost. Some suggestions include the introduction of British-style capitation 
for GPs in combination with incentives for rewarding highly productive 
physiciansn (Blomqvist 1995). Others suggest managed care through the 
creation of a network of HMO-style service providers such as a “Targeted 
Medical Agency” in which physicians in group practice act as agents to 
purchase medical procedures and diagnostic services (Jerome-Forget and Forget 
1995). So far, however, concrete attempts at introducing such practices (for 
example, Ontario’s “Comprehensive Health Organizations”) have had limited 
success because of the difficulties of recruitment and coordination (Closson and 
Catt 1996). Although such alternatives attempt to build on the 
“entrepreneurship” potential of physicians, most Canadian doctors are 
committed to retaining a fee-for-service payment system. In addition, freedom 
of choice is considered an important element of the health care system for 
Canadians. While integrated delivery systems may not contravene the principles 
of the Canada Health Act, limits on the choice of providers may be considered 
contrary to the “spirit” of the existing health care system.
Regional Boards and the Allocation of Health Care
In the flurry of reform proposals discussed by the provinces in the past decade, 
“regionalization” was a consistent theme. This was to involve devolving power 
from provincial health ministries to regional or local bodies that would have 
some level of discretion in allocating health care resources. This would permit 
the kind of necessary decentralization that could lead to population-based 
funding and other allocative efficiencies, such as ensuring the optimal level of 
resource mix for a particular region (Dorland and Davis 1996). Although almost 
all the provinces have in fact instituted such regionalization through the creation 
or reorganization of existing local and regional health boards, these experiments 
have not all been successful in establishing efficiency via internal markets. Part 
of the problem lies in the fact that such boards are not always empowered to 
make important decisions. In addition, questions have been raised as to just 
what kinds of decisions such boards are equipped to make, particularly if they 
are non-elected and hence not publicly accountable. Of particular concern is the 
tendency of local bodies to focus on local concerns - even at the expense of the 





























































































The past decade has been one of continuity and change in the Canadian health 
care system. In comparison with many European countries, changes to health 
care have been minimal in the sense that parallel markets and even internal 
market incentives remain limited. Nevertheless, real change has occurred in the 
way in which governments have attempted to regulate providers and consumers 
of care in an effort to control public health care expenditures. These initiatives, 
while successful in exerting a measure of cost-control into the system, have 
been unable to change the actual institutions of health care financing and 
delivery. Indeed, they have exposed several fissures in the health care system: 
conflict between federal and provincial governments over health policy; conflict 
between governments and providers over levels of renumeration and regulation 
of the profession; and dissatisfaction within the public over the pace and extent 
of reform.
These fissures may grow deeper as the debate over health care reform 
continues in Canada. The recent injection of more public money into the system 
will probably not assuage the enduring financial pressures that continue to exist, 
nor will the federal government’s budget largesse satisfy, in the long term, 
attempts by some provincial governments to exercise more flexibility in 
introducing health care reforms that include alternative models of health care 
financing and organization.
For the moment, the Canada Health Act exerts an institutional brake to 
the type of widespread market incentives being introduced in other countries. 
But this brake may not hold indefinitely as health care system in Canada 
remains under strain, both financially and politically. While public opinion and 
political discourse remains supportive of the system, the status quo seems 
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